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Notes
USING COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW TO RESOLVE DOMESTIC
FEDERAL QUESTIONS
DONALD E. CHILDRESS III
“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding. . . . [W]here there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to
1
be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of
other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural
differences between their systems and our own. But their experience
may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
2
different solutions to a common legal problem . . . .

INTRODUCTION
Something startling happened at the United States Supreme
Court in June 2003. In Lawrence v. Texas, a 6-3 decision invalidating
3
a Texas statute that made it a crime for two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct,4 the Supreme Court did
what it had never done before in the main body of text in such a
5
momentous case. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, cited

Copyright © 2003 by Donald E. Childress III.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2264–65 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
3. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2002).
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
5. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases, USA TODAY, July 8, 2003,
at 9A; see also David Keene, Justices: When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do, THE HILL, July 15,
2003, at 17 (noting that this “was the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court had ever cited
foreign decisions and opinions in this way as major determining factors in a major case”).
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foreign legal precedent—specifically, a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, as well as examples of the legal culture of
other nations—in support of the Court’s ultimate holding. As Justice
Kennedy noted: “[A]lmost five years before Bowers [v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986),] was decided the European Court of Human
Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s
case. . . . The [European] court held that the laws proscribing the
conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
6
Rights,” and that “[o]ther nations have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage
in intimate, consensual conduct.”7 Given this citation, it now appears
that some form of comparative constitutional analysis may be used in
8
the future to resolve domestic federal questions. This use of
comparativism, however, may portend a shift of tectonic plates9—a
shift that has been occurring for some time without sufficient
rationalization.
Like Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v.
10
Virginia illustrates well this major fault line in contemporary
constitutional adjudication concerning whether and when
comparative constitutional analysis is appropriate authority to resolve
domestic federal constitutional questions. In Atkins, the Supreme
Court concluded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is a
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.11 As momentous as this holding is for Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence generally, the majority opinion is
noteworthy for another reason: it, like Lawrence, appeals to
comparative law as persuasive authority to help resolve the
constitutional question. While Atkins was not the first time that the

6.
7.
8.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2483.
See Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13:
The Supreme Court is going global—and not just in the sense that several of the
justices have embarked on their annual summer voyages to European destinations.
Rather, the court’s own decision-making is beginning to reflect the influence of
international legal norms, as well as rulings by courts in foreign countries.

9. Cf. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these
foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions
on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . .
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”) (citations omitted).
10. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
11. Id. at 2246–52.
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12
Supreme Court employed comparative constitutional analysis, the
Atkins decision is salient because it exposes acutely the debate among
the Justices concerning the relevance of comparative constitutional
law.
Writing for a majority that included Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens dropped a
curious footnote to bolster the claim that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals “has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that
13
a national consensus has developed against it.” Among other
authorities, the Court cited a brief filed on behalf of the European
Union as amicus curiae in the different case of McCarver v. North
Carolina,14 in support of the proposition that “within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”15
While the majority noted that the practices of other countries were by
no means dispositive, the consistency of such practices with legislative
evidence provided “further support to our conclusion that there is a
consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”16
This citation set off a flurry of criticism in the dissenting
opinions. To the dissenters, comparative constitutional law was
inappropriate for determining the constitutional question in the case
at bar. In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words:

I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s
ultimate determination. While it is true that some of our prior
opinions have looked to “the climate of international opinion” to
reinforce a conclusion regarding evolving standards of decency, we
have since explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing practices
of other countries could “serve to establish the first Eighth
Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among
17
our people.”

12. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
13. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 (emphasis added).
14. Brief for the European Union as Amicus Curiae at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina,
O.T.2001 (No. 00-8727). While originally submitted to support Ernest McCarver, the European
Union brief was later filed on behalf of Daryl Atkins when McCarver’s sentence was commuted
by the North Carolina legislature, thus mooting McCarver.
15. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.21 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2254 (citations omitted).
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And Justice Scalia opined:
[T]he Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “national
consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a
footnote) to the views of . . . members of the so-called “world
community” . . . . I agree with the Chief Justice . . . . Equally
irrelevant are the practices of the “world community,” whose
18
notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.

Both dissents were joined by Justice Thomas,19 thus setting up a
tentative division of 6-3 concerning the relevance of comparative
constitutional law for resolving Eighth Amendment questions—the
20
same split that decided Lawrence a year later.
Using the Atkins decision as a foil for reflection, this Note
explores this tension by inquiring whether comparative constitutional
analysis, while rich in substance, is incongruous to the task of
21
interpreting the United States Constitution. In short, comparative
constitutional analysis presupposes that there is a public good and
right political order to be achieved through judicial reason. Yet, the
United States Constitution might presuppose, in contrast, that there is
never a right political order to be achieved through the judiciary
alone. In so arguing, this Note seeks to remedy a defect in the
scholarly literature by illustrating that the current debate about
comparative constitutional law is not a debate about comparativism
as such. Rather, the debate exemplified in Atkins and Lawrence is a
debate about the role of the judiciary within American democracy.
In Part I, this Note briefly describes what comparative
constitutional law has meant and currently means for American
courts. Building upon Part I, Part II puts forward the claim that one’s
view of the appropriateness of comparative constitutional analysis is
ultimately a reflection of the interpretive posture of the advocate—
judge, lawyer, or scholar—regarding the role of the Supreme Court in
American democracy. As this Note argues, comparative
constitutional analysis may be appropriate as part of a view towards
interpreting the Constitution that relies heavily on a common law
18. Id. at 2264–65 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 2252, 2259.
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
21. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (“[C]omparative
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one.”).
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conception of constitutionalism that provides the Court with an
22
expanded, quasi-legislative role. In contrast, a textualist school of
23
constitutionalism might resist the utilization of comparative law in
order to exercise judicial restraint so as not to “impose upon those
people of the United States norms that those people themselves
(through their democratic institutions) have not accepted.”24 The
exchange in Atkins is illustrative of this current divide on the Court
and ultimately reflects Justice Scalia’s remark in Lawrence that the
Court’s discussion of “foreign views” is “meaningless” yet
“[d]angerous” dicta.25 Finally, in Part III this Note urges restraint as
to the use of comparative constitutional law so as to ensure that the
law is not usurped from its organic ground: the American people.
I. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As the classics of constitutional theory—from Aristotle’s
26
27
Politics to The Federalist —make plain, a comparative perspective
can be “helpful in the quest for a theory of the public good and right
28
political order.” Comparative constitutional law can “represent a
disinterested quest for a public philosophy and a statement of the
rights and duties that would be assigned in a more perfect
constitutional polity.”29 For nearly a century and a half, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States gave short shrift to this

22. See infra Part II.A–B.
23. See infra Part II.C–D.
24. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119 (1996).
25. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 4, ch. 3, at 241 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin
Books 1962) (“The reason for the plurality of constitutions lies in the plurality of parts in every
state . . . . We see this in Chalcis and Eretria and, on the Asiatic side, Magnesia on the
Maeander, and other areas.”).
27. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289–90 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961):
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest
tendency continually betraying itself in the members to despoil the general
government of its authorities . . . . In the Achaean league it is probable that the
federal head had a degree and species of power which gave it a considerable likeness
to the government framed by the convention.
28. Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 JOHN
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 692 (1976); see also VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (1999) (“Centuries ago scholars and political activists
ranging from Aristotle to James Madison compared and analyzed systems of government to
determine how best to constitute polities.”).
29. Kommers, supra note 28, at 692.
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30
remonstrance. Remarkably, with the Court’s recent decisions in
Atkins and Lawrence, the stage may be set for an increased utilization
31
of comparative constitutional analysis. After first providing an
overview of comparative constitutional law, this Part examines the
use of comparativism by American courts and evaluates the argument
that comparative constitutional law should be used to interpret
the Constitution.

A. Overview
Comparative constitutional law is a subfield of the larger
discipline of comparative law. With roots going back to the time of
Aristotle, the academic discipline of comparative law traces its origins
to Paris in 1900, when the French scholars Édouard Lambert and
Raymond Saleilles32 founded the International Congress for
Comparative Law.33 The goals of Messrs. Lambert and Saleilles were
not modest. Armed with an unshakeable belief in progress, the two
scholars set about developing a common law of humankind (droit
commun de l’humanité) and a system of world law.34 Later, with the
atrocities of two world wars and the threat of nuclear annihilation
looming, the belief in progress dimmed, but the comparative
enterprise still flourished.35 Today, the blossoming of comparative law
is particularly evidenced throughout the European countries, which

30. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:
Opening up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
583, 585 (1998) (“[C]ourts in the United States exercising the power of judicial review had no
precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority.”
(quoting William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, Address in
Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the German Basic Law (1989), in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411,
412 (Paul Kirchoff & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993)).
31. This is a trend that perhaps has been germinating for some time. See Alain A.
Levasseur, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY
COURTS 315, 325–31 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1997) (illustrating the various uses of
comparative law by the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts from 1907 to 1995).
32. For an excellent overview on these scholars comparing and contrasting their
comparative methodologies, see generally Christophe Jamin, Saleilles’ and Lambert’s Old
Dream Revisited, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 701–18 (2002).
33. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 2 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
34. Id. at 3.
35. See id. (“The belief in progress, so characteristic of 1900, has died. World wars have
weakened, if not destroyed, faith in world law. Yet despite a more sceptical [sic] way of looking
at the world, the development and enrichment of comparative law has been steady.”).
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enjoy rich cross-fertilization of legislative and judicial decisionmaking
36
in the areas of both public and private law.
Modern comparative law is seen by many as a science, the
37
ultimate aim of which is knowledge. As the leading textbook on
comparative law notes, the basic rule of comparativism is that
“different legal systems give the same or very similar solutions, even
as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the great differences
in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of
operation.”38 Such an approach to comparative law has been termed
functionalism.39 Functionalists see political institutions as performing
40
certain tasks that are common to all systems of governance. While
this approach to comparative law has been adopted in many
countries, including Canada, Germany, and South Africa,41 the
42
American experience with comparative law has been more hesitant.

36. See generally JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 28 (compiling decisions of various
European courts, as well as other foreign legal materials).
37. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 33, at 15.
38. Id. at 39.
39. See id. at 34 (“The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of
functionality.”). Professor Mark Tushnet notes that Justice Breyer has perhaps adopted this
functionalist approach. Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative
Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 326 (1998).
40. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1238 (1999):
A functionalist might claim, for example, that such systems must have some
institutions to resolve conflicts among their components, or mechanisms for ensuring
some stability in a changing extra-political environment. Functionalists naturally
think in comparative terms, for only by examining different political systems can they
identify the functions common to all and the institutions they think serve those
functions. Functionalism faces challenges from two directions. It must avoid
specifying functions so generally that its purported insights become banal. But it must
also avoid specifying functions so precisely that every institution performs a complex
set of functions unique to it as an institution.
(citations omitted).
41. Cf. JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 28, at 455–607 (illustrating the approach to
judicial review taken by various constitutional courts). The basis for this utilization perhaps
points to a particular role of judicial authority in these countries. For instance, the Supreme
Court of Israel might engage in comparative analysis. But, such utilization foreshadows a view
as to the role of the court in that society. Cf. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 27–28 (2002) (“The primary
concern of the supreme court in a democracy is not to correct individual mistakes in lower court
judgments. . . . The supreme court’s primary concern is broader, systemwide corrective action.
This corrective action should focus on two main issues: bridging the gap between law and
society, and protecting democracy.”) (citations omitted).
42. See generally Jackson, supra note 30, at 585. (detailing the “ambivalent resistance of
U.S. constitutional law to explicit learning and borrowing from other nations’ constitutional
decisions and traditions”).
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B. The American Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law
In America’s courts, “[t]here is an increasing use of foreign
law . . . associated with the internationalization of civil procedure and
criminal procedure.”43 Such utilization is “tied to the growth in trade
and investment across national borders and the ease of long distance
travel and communication,” and it “manifests itself when a domestic
court must deal with a foreign law issue, collect evidence abroad,
extradite a fugitive, or obtain jurisdiction over a foreign country
defendant.”44 Outside these fields, there is “scant legal literature on
the use of foreign and comparative law in United States courts
45
because courts rarely cite foreign law.” This development is quite
curious because before the American Civil War, courts regularly
referred to Roman law, civil law (that is, the law of continental
Europe), and English common law.46
47
The memorable case of Pierson v. Post is instructive. In that
case, the Supreme Court of New York held that wild animals become
the property of a person when mortally wounded or entrapped, so as
48
to be deprived of their natural liberty by that person. In order to
reach this result, the majority opinion delivered by Justice Thompkins
carefully canvassed the writings of Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, and
Grotius.49 Yet, in the twentieth century, such appeals were few and far
between, except for the occasional reference to the writings of
50
Blackstone. Various reasons may account for this shift, but it is
possible that the influence of the historical school of jurisprudence,
coupled with “the adequacy of the West Publishing Company’s
national reporter and digest system in accumulating a corpus of
43. David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative Law by American Courts, in THE USE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS, supra note 31, at 297.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally Levasseur, supra note 31, at 316–24. While beyond the scope of this Note,
more work remains to be done exploring these early efforts at comparativism and applying them
to the modern resurgence.
47. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
48. Id. at 176–79.
49. Id. at 176–78.
50. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *234–35); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (citing 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23–24). A Westlaw search of the U.S. Supreme Court
database (“SCT”) within the period January 1900 to June 2003 with the query “William
Blackstone,” or “W. Blackstone,” or “Blackstone,” yielded 309 cases in which Blackstone
and/or his Commentaries were cited.
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American law, and the general social force of nationalism”
contributed to the ending of the brief American experiment with
51
comparative law.
In short, the American experiment with comparative law was
limited to a time in American history when there was little or no
indigenous precedent to draw upon to reach conclusions of law. Thus,
American judges freely canvassed the law of other nations to extend
52
the common law to American situations. Once an indigenous
common law developed, the perceived need for comparative analysis
was not as great and courts became less inclined to look outside of
American borders.
Like American courts generally, the United States Supreme
53
Court has been wary of using comparative constitutional analysis.
Although comparative law has been used by various Justices at
isolated times,54 on multiple occasions, the present Court has rejected

51. Clark, supra note 43, at 298.
52. See DARGU DAS BASU, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (1984) (“[I]t is
natural that while interpreting those provisions of the American Constitution which embody
common law principles, the American judges would seek light from English precedents where
the common law concept had been explained. This broad principle . . . has been emphasized by
the Supreme Court ever since its inception.” (footnote omitted) (citing Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3
Dall. 386; Cummings v. Missouri, (1867) 4 Wall. 277)).
53. It is important to note the distinction between using the law of another country (e.g.,
the common law of England) for determining the meaning of specific words when the
Constitution was written (e.g., using the common law as of 1791 to determine the distinction
between law and equity) and using comparative analysis to interpret the Constitution in the
present (e.g., to understand “evolving standards of decency”). The former is done frequently to
give context and meaning to American constitutional history and tradition. The latter, and the
use of comparative analysis which this Note discusses, is perhaps more questionable. For further
discussion, see infra note 131 and accompanying text, and Part III.
54. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that other nations with federal systems “have found that local control is
better maintained” by allowing the national government to use local governments to administer
national law); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129–33 (1973) (Blackmun, J.) (citing to Persian,
Greek, Roman, and English laws to show that abortion before quickening was not an indictable
offense); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580, 583 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (appealing
in two footnotes to the laws of Argentina, Canada, and Australia to uphold the right of
Congress to tax the state of New York on sales of mineral waters); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 419–20 (1907) (Brewer, J.) (adopting as persuasive authority the various foreign statutes
initially presented by the soon-to-be Justice Louis Brandeis in the famous “Brandeis Brief”); see
also David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 544–
49 (2001) (illustrating a history of the uses of comparative law by individual Supreme
Court Justices).
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55
outright the use of comparative constitutional analysis. But, given
the use of comparative constitutional analysis in Atkins and
Lawrence, the tide may indeed be turning.

C. The Aims of Comparative Constitutional Law
Comparativists have set forth various aims of comparative
constitutional law.56 To many scholars, the use of comparative
constitutional law by U.S. courts is a logical extension of the process
57
of globalization. Some judges, such as Judge Guido Calabresi of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have
acknowledged this argument, especially in the context of comparing
judicial systems which were put in place after World War II under
Allied occupation.58 An analogous sentiment was expressed recently
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who urged American courts to look to
55. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 (Scalia, J.) (“[C]omparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to
the task of writing one.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.):
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici . . . that the sentencing
practices of other countries are relevant. While “[t]he practices of other nations,
particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice
uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our mores,
but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,” they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.
(citations omitted). But see Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2249–50 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.)
(“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”).
56. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254–63 (2001)
(emphasizing that comparative constitutional law may help one understand what the law is, may
help one understand one’s own constitutional tradition better, may help elucidate different
functional concerns to similar questions, and may strengthen the quality of judicial decisions by
providing a benchmark against which they can be judged). For a thoughtful critique of using
comparative law, see generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking
Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985) (criticizing the continuing “endless search for
a neutral stance and objective status” within comparative law).
57. E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103–04
(2000); Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1230–38.
58. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995):
At one time, America had a virtual monopoly on constitutional judicial review, and if
a doctrine or approach was not tried out here, there was no place else to look. That
situation no longer holds. Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of
judicial review, which—though different from ours in many particulars—
unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory
and practice. These countries are our “constitutional offspring” and how they have
dealt with problems analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.
(citations omitted).
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“the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
59
deliberative process.” Further, as Justice O’Connor has articulated:
“I think that I, and the other Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, will
find ourselves looking more frequently to the decisions of other
constitutional courts. . . . All of these courts have something to teach
60
us about the civilizing functions of constitutional law.” And Justice
Breyer opined in the wake of Lawrence:
We see all the time, Justice O’Connor and I, and the others, how the
world really—it’s trite but it’s true—is growing together . . . .
Through commerce, through globalization, through the spread of
democratic institutions, through immigration to America, it’s
becoming more and more one world of many different kinds of
people . . . . And how they’re going to live together across the world
will be the challenge, and whether our Constitution and how it fits
into the governing documents of other nations, I think will be a
61
challenge for the next generations.

The above examples would seem to confirm that comparative law
should be used by judges to inform their decisions, and is being used
to do the same.
Yet all is not well in the land of comparative constitutionalism.
Some of the current Justices have expressed antagonism to the
62
consideration of foreign law in constitutional interpretation. When
confronted with petitioners who argued that twenty-plus years on

59. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, Address in
Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the German Basic Law (1989), in GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411,
412 (Paul Kirchoff & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). Notice, however, that this sentiment is
not in accord with the Chief Justice’s pronouncements in Atkins. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia,
122 S. Ct. 2242, 2254 (2002) (“I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding
the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate determination.”).
Or is it? The Chief Justice’s use of the words “deliberative process” might imply that through
transnational judicial conferences, for instance, judges might benefit from the comparative
enterprise, even though such comparativism would never manifest itself explicitly in the
jurisprudence of the Court.
60. Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers
Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2.
61. John H. Cushman, Jr., O’Connor Indicates She Will Remain on Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2003, at A1.
62. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2254 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.).
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63
death row was cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Thomas
recently put his view of comparative analysis this way:

I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the
American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his
execution is delayed. Indeed, were there any such support in our
own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the
claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the
64
Privy Council.

Comparative constitutional analysis, to be sure, did not help these
petitioners. Nevertheless, the majority decisions in Atkins and
Lawrence point to a purposeful use of comparison in reaching the
final decision.
The primary aim of comparativism from the judge’s perspective
65
is that it serves as an aid in interpretation. Recourse to such an aid
would not be needed should there be unequivocal national rules
66
which could be applied to the case at hand. However, even the most
committed textualist encounters times where it is necessary to plug
holes in the process of interpretation.
There are a variety of ways in which the legal propositions used
to plug holes can be characterized from a constitutional point of view.
According to Professor Phillip Bobbit, legal propositions may be
differentiated along six modes of constitutional argument:
historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of
the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average
contemporary “man on the street”); structural (inferring rules from

63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (No.
98-9741).
64. Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). The reference to
“proponents” above refers in part to Justice Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari which
cites the mentioned foreign legal precedent. See id. at 995–96.
65. Cf. Kommers, supra note 28, at 695 (“German and American constitutional principles
and theories could be blended fruitfully and seasonably to produce more equitable balances
between rights and duties within the American political order.”).
66. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 33, at 18 (“It is clear that such foreign material
cannot be used in order to bypass unequivocal national rules . . . . But the question may be
raised when the construction of the rule is doubtful, or where there is a lacuna in the system
which the judge must fill.”).
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the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the
structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by
precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of
the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and
prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a
67
particular rule).

Some scholars have argued that comparative constitutional law
68
should be added to this typology to help expound the Constitution.
As Professor Vicki Jackson has noted, judges might regard “legal
sources, including the decisions of other constitutional courts, as
being binding, or as nonbinding but relevant authority that must be
considered, or as of only possible relevance and persuasive value that
69
may be considered.” David Fontana has argued that judges should
consider using comparative constitutional law when American
sources do not provide clear answers to the question the judge must
answer.70 At least one Justice has accepted this reasoning, noting that
the experience of other countries may indeed “cast an empirical light
on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem.”71 Such arguments, however, presuppose a certain way of

67. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). This typology is
too simplistic to cover the rich and varied literature on constitutional interpretation. Yet, for the
purposes of this Note, it provides a common hermeneutical lens without requiring that a
position be taken regarding the “deeper” discussion of constitutional interpretation. A word of
thanks goes to Professor Ralf Michaels for challenging my use of this typology and for helpful
comments, both here and elsewhere.
68. E.g., Slaughter, supra note 57, at 1103; Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1225.
69. Jackson, supra note 56, at 258 n.164 (emphasis removed).
70. See Fontana, supra note 54, at 556–57:
The judge should use the comparative legal materials only if the contextual
differences are relatively minimal—if the problems faced by importing a solution or
fact from another country are relatively insignificant. The judge should then consider
whether the comparative materials have any comparative advantages, the
paradigmatic case of when comparativism would be appropriate, or simply provide
another “data point” (factual or legal). Within the framework of a trial or appeal, a
judge should encourage litigants to argue comparative constitutional law to courts
(when appropriate), sometimes even using expert witnesses on foreign law who can
help the judge determine the relevant comparative constitutional law and its
transferability. Judges who use comparative constitutional law and solicit expert
witnesses to help them do so will encourage litigants to argue and brief foreign law,
thereby making the judicial use of comparative constitutional law more accurate
because it will be based on a number of different sources.
(footnote omitted).
71. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The approach
taken [in some federal] cases is consistent with that of other constitutional courts facing similar
complex constitutional problems.”).
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viewing the method of interpretation undertaken by the judge. For
those willing to accept comparison as an appropriate interpretive tool,
the Constitution is presumably seen as part of the common law
tradition, as opposed to a text that is to be interpreted in light of the
72
context of the words. But, should the courts be in the business of
displacing the “messiness of politics with the ostensible reasonability
73
and order of judicial decision-making?” In the next Part, this Note
puts forward the claim that the arguments in favor of comparative
constitutional analysis are pended to a certain conception of
constitutional interpretation grounded in the common law and, more
generally, to the role of the judiciary in a democracy.
II. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
What is the role of the judge in interpreting the American
Constitution? Providing an answer to this question offers a glimpse
into the role of comparative constitutional analysis emphasized by the
majority and minority in Atkins, and into the greater debate
concerning comparative constitutionalism. As the following Section
makes clear, one’s view of the appropriateness of using comparative
constitutional analysis correlates closely with one’s view of the role of
the judiciary within the United States’ constitutional framework, as
well as one’s view of the Constitution itself.
A. The Constitution and the Common Law
Like other countries descended from the English legal system,
74
the United States is part of the common law tradition. Yet,
72. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 13 (1997):
But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its process, I do question
whether the attitude of the common-law judge—the mind-set that asks, “What is the
most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments to the
achievement of that result be evaded?”—is appropriate for most of the work that I
do, and much of the work that state judges do.
73. Paul D. Carrington & H. Jefferson Powell, The Right to Self-Government After Bush v.
Gore, Duke Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 26, at 16 (Dec.
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=293934 (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
74. BASU, supra note 52, at 10. Professor Melvin Eisenberg has defined the American
experience with the common law as follows:
Much of our law derives from rules laid down in constitutions, statutes, or other
authoritative texts that the courts must interpret but may not reformulate. The
common law, in contrast, is that part of the law that is within the province of the
courts themselves to establish. In some areas of law, like torts and contracts, common
law rules predominate. In other areas, like corporations, they are extremely
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American history has shown that codification through legislative
75
action has served to gradually replace part of the common law. The
first codification in American history was likely the original Articles
of Confederation, followed shortly thereafter by the United States
Constitution.76 The key to understanding this codification lies in part
in understanding whether or not the United States Constitution was
77
preservative or transformative in scope. Preservative constitutions,
like the English (unwritten) constitution, tend to enshrine (so as to
protect) longstanding practices that might be endangered by
momentary lapses and passions of the public will.78 In contrast,
transformative constitutions, such as the South African Constitution,
attempt “not to preserve an idealized past but to point the way
toward an ideal future.”79 Transformative constitutions, if bracketed
with judicial authority, may produce an activist court, which readily
displaces the views of the legislature in favor of an ideal future. For
instance, in the words of the Constitutional Court of South Africa:
[T]he Constitution [of South Africa] is not simply some kind of
statutory codification of an acceptable or legitimate past. It retains
from the past only what is defensible and represents a radical and
decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It
constitutes a decisive break from [apartheid and racism] . . . to a
constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and
universal human rights for . . . all ages, classes, and colours. . . . The
past was pervaded by inequality, authoritarianism, and repression.
The aspiration of the future is based on what is “justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” It is
premised on a legal culture of accountability and transparency. The
relevant provisions of the Constitution must therefore be

important. In all areas, even those that are basically constitutional or statutory, they
figure at least interstitially.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (1988).
75. BASU, supra note 52, at 10.
76. Throughout the colonial period, the question of the legal force of the common law had
been a source of debate. FRED V. CAHILL, JR., JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 16 n.26 (1952). Opposition to the common law was at times so
intense that acts were passed to prevent its citation. Id. The common law was opposed “because
it was British and because it contained rules that were not liked in this country.” Id. Codes were
urged “because they were more democratic and because it was thought that a written law would
be at once less complex and easier to understand.” Id.
77. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 67 (2001).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 68.
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interpreted so as to give effect to the purposes sought to be
80
advanced by their enactment.

While the United States Constitution may have transformative
81
elements such as the Reconstruction-era amendments, looked at as a
whole it is highly preservative.82 And it is preservative of a certain
83
model of government. The United States Constitution sought to
codify the common law inherited from the British, as modified
through the American experience, into a set of precise and limited
enumerated powers to create a federal government characterized by a
separation of powers. James Madison noted that “[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined.”84 Madison further opined that those powers
which “are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.”85 Madison likewise highlighted the point of limited
enumerated powers in his address to the Virginia delegates, convened
86
in Richmond on June 2, 1788, to vote on the new constitution.
Responding to Patrick Henry, Madison argued that “the Constitution
did not give the federal government authority to intrude on the
individual liberties of citizens, and that therefore explicit guarantees
were unnecessary.”87 In short, to Madison, the Constitution was a
80. Shabalala v. Attorney-General, Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725, 740 (CC) (citations
omitted).
81. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 77, at 68 (arguing that the United States Constitution has
“transformative elements, both in the original rejection of the monarchical heritage and in the
constitutional reforms of the Civil War era, rejecting slavery and authorizing the national
government to do a great deal to promote equality”) (citation omitted).
82. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 27, at 293 (James Madison):
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that
the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the
Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of
commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few
oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to
war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more
considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the Articles of
Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only
substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them.
83. See Richard Hodder-Williams, The Constitution (1787) and Modern American
Government, in CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 73, 76 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1986)
(“[T]he primacy of the legislative branch is symbolized by the first article’s attention and
concern for Congress; the executive branch was consciously relegated to second place.”).
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 27, at 292 (James Madison).
85. Id.
86. JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL,
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 22 (2002).
87. Id. at 24.
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document that did not go beyond the limited and specific enumerated
powers therein granted to a federal, as opposed to a national,
government.
Regardless, the Constitution had to be interpreted, and the task
88
of interpretation fell to the judiciary. At the founding, the Framers
faced a dilemma “between a global rejection of any and all methods
of constitutional construction and a willingness to interpret the
constitutional text in accordance with the common law principles that
had been used to construe statutes.”89 The same tension was exposed
within the judiciary regarding appropriate tools of analysis.90
Ultimately, the Court of the 1950s and 1960s firmly ensconced “the
preference for judge-made over enacted law that had been so evident
in constitutional interpretation at the turn of the century.”91 How did
this come to be? As Justice Scalia has argued, the temptation to
92
“carry on the common-law tradition” is to blame.

88. As William Howard Taft articulated:
In the United States, however, we have a written Constitution. It declares the
fundamental law and it imposes limitations upon the powers of all branches of the
Government. Now if any branch of the Government exceeds those powers to which it
is thus limited, the act is without authority and must be void. The question is who is to
determine whether the act does exceed the authority given. The action of the
Supreme Court is confined to the hearing and decision of real litigated cases and the
exercise of judicial power between parties. It is essential to the carrying out of this
jurisdiction that the court should determine what the law is governing the issue
between the litigants.
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 163 (1913); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 467–68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. . . .
[This conclusion does not] by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both,
and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition
to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the
fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental.
89. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 887 (1985).
90. Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 107–08 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
91. Id. at 108.
92. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 11–14 (1994); See also KENNETH
W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 26 (2002) (“It is
as Justice Scalia sees it, the temptation to carry on the common-law tradition. Keep making the
law. Judges weave contract law, tort law, property law, so why not the ‘higher law’ of
the Constitution?”).
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This preference for the common law method of judging has led
to the current positions in the Supreme Court concerning
comparative constitutional analysis. Professor Patrick Glenn
articulates well the position that, as architects of judge-made law,
judges are “called upon to decide cases or enact norms or give
opinions, but the search for law is too important for any potential
93
external source to be eliminated a priori.” But this ratio decendi only
holds if the judge considers the task of decisionmaking to be flexible,
and places at the apex of the political order the judiciary itself.
B. The Common Law Approach Exemplified
The common law approach to constitutional interpretation
produces a flexible approach to decisionmaking. Under this approach,
the judge is not constrained by simple text or structure, but has to
take into account, as a scientist would, the totality of all evidence in
order to render a decision. In this mold, comparative constitutional
analysis is appropriate, for it affords the judge an opportunity to see
the law as never definitively given and “always to be sought, in the
endlessly original process of resolution of individual disputes
through law.”94
Justice Stevens’s approach to the resolution of the legal issue in
Atkins is indicative of this method. The majority opened by
referencing the explicit text of the Eighth Amendment that
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
95
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Emphasizing the
accumulation of precedent to determine what is cruel and unusual,
the Court noted that through case law “we have read the text of the
amendment to prohibit all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and
unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.”96

93. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 293 (1987).
94. Id.
95. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002). It bears repeating that throughout this
Note the Atkins decision is being used as a foil to explore the issue of comparative constitutional
analysis. It is not the purpose of this Note to deal with the specific question of whether in
Atkins, or in any case involving the Eighth Amendment, comparative analysis can inform the
agreed-upon standard. To be sure, there are arguments and counterarguments to be made
exploring this specific question. My point here is more limited and, I believe, epistemologically
more important. In short, the current debate about comparative constitutional law is not a
debate about comparativism as such. Rather, the debate exemplified in Atkins is a debate about
the role of the judiciary within American democracy.
96. Id. at 2246 n.7.
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Next, the Court explained how the evaluation of excessiveness is
97
to be made. Again, an appeal to case law led the majority to
98
conclude, quoting Trop v. Dulles, that “[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man” and the Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”99
The particular words used by the Court are important. This is not
about a particular text as such, but it is about the “basic concept
100
To the majority, the
underlying the Eighth Amendment.”
appropriate approach to be taken when interpreting the Amendment
is a conceptual approach evidencing concern for both human dignity
and evolving standards of decency. And such a conceptual approach
might encompass broader evaluations of evidence than would a
textual or structural approach.
Continuing with the analysis, the Court elucidated that the
evolving standards are informed by an appeal to “contemporary
values,” as emphasized most clearly and reliably by legislation
101
But, adding up the
enacted by “the country’s legislatures.”
legislative enactments does not resolve the issue. The majority noted
that the judgment of the Court itself must be “brought to bear” by
asking “whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”102 In sum, what is cruel
and unusual punishment for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment
is not simply a textual question. Rather, the determination is a
conceptual question that relies on evaluating the evidence of state
legislative pronouncements in light of a standard of reasonableness as
determined by the Supreme Court. In this approach, comparative
constitutional analysis can serve an important function.103
Anticipating the ultimate outcome, the majority emphasized that
“it is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but
the consistency of the direction of change” that aids in the

97. See id. at 2247 (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards
that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of
Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”).
98. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
99. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2247–48.
103. Notice that this is similar to the approach advocated by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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determination of whether or not the execution of mentally retarded
104
individuals is cruel and unusual punishment. After canvassing the
law of various states, the majority concluded that the practice of
executing the mentally retarded “has become truly unusual, and it is
fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.”105
This statement is particularly interesting for it is buttressed by a
footnote that cites the practice of European countries for determining
106
that a national consensus has developed. One might query how the
practice of European countries helps this majority determine whether
or not a national consensus has developed against execution of the
mentally retarded. In the strict sense, it does not. A national
consensus would be totally confined to the nation that is consenting.
But, in a looser conceptual sense—a sense that places not the
legislature but the Court at the apex of constitutional governance—
comparative analysis does help resolve the question. For,
determination of the Eighth Amendment issue is a conceptual
question that must be made by the Court, taking into account various
indices of reasonableness and not just what is determined reasonable
by the state legislatures. In this approach, comparative constitutional
analysis allows the judge to determine a “‘better solution’ for his time
and place.”107 And the majority in this case employed constitutional
analysis to determine in this time and place that the execution of the
mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment.
What are the implications of this approach? Effectively, the
majority has made three jurisprudential moves. First, it has
determined that the Eighth Amendment is not mere text, but that it is
a concept that has to be interpreted based on the common law
108
precedent of excessiveness. Second, the majority has emphasized
that the determination of what is excessive is a determination that
must be made by reference in some degree to state legislative
pronouncements.109 Third, the majority has determined that the
pronouncements of state legislatures do not per se resolve the issue,
and that the Court itself is the ultimate arbiter of what is excessive in
104. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 2250 n.21 (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”)
(emphasis added).
107. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 33, at 15.
108. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2246–47.
109. Id. at 2247.
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110
terms of evolving standards of decency. With this approach,
comparative constitutional analysis provides “advice on legal
111
policy” that aids in the Court’s decision. There is something
striking, however, about this approach. Is the role of the Court to
advise on legal policy or to expound the law? And should the Court
be the institution empowered, even above a national consensus of
state legislatures, to determine by its own standards that a
punishment is excessive? The dissenting opinions in Atkins
foreshadow an answer to these questions by emphasizing the
separation of powers, federalism, and democratic concerns with
this approach.

C. Contra Comparative Constitutional Analysis
The dissenting opinions in Atkins articulate well the various
pitfalls of comparative analysis. The dissenters note that the
Constitution is a text that should be interpreted through recourse to
textualism and structuralism, if due deference is to be given to
concerns of federalism, separation of powers, and democracy.
The textualist approach is one grounded in the separation of
powers and reservations as to the completeness of the common law
method.112 The completeness of the common law method has been
113
called into question by legal realism. Legal realism challenged the
idea that the judge discovered the law by showing that the judge
makes the law.114 This in turn poses problems for a framework of
government that is divided between a legislative branch and a judicial
one. With this realization, textualists argue that “the main danger in
judicial interpretation . . . is that the judges will mistake their own
115
predilections for the law.” In a similar vein, James Madison,
referencing Montesquieu, noted that if “the power of judging joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
110. Id. at 2247–48.
111. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 33, at 11.
112. In beginning this Section with a brief summary of textualism, I mean not to imply that
the Chief Justice or Justice Scalia is using this view of the Constitution as their only means of
interpretation. Rather, by beginning with textualism, I hope to set the stage for the more
general discussions of text, structure, federalism, separation of powers, and democracy that are
emphasized throughout the dissenting opinions and this Section.
113. SCALIA, supra note 72, at 10.
114. Id.
115. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989).
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116
legislator.” Should the legislative function and the judicial function
be joined, there would be a greater chance of tyranny.117 For, in so
doing, the judicial function usurps the ability of the people to say
what the law is and to determine for themselves what kind of
constitutional polity to live in.
Perhaps the clearest statement of this position is put forward by
118
Justice Scalia in his essay A Matter of Interpretation. There, Justice
Scalia emphasizes that the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
inherited a common law tradition whereby the judges themselves,
through deciding cases, develop principles of law binding not only on
the parties in the particular case at hand, but also on other judges—in
particular the Courts of Appeals—handling future cases.119 To combat
this tendency, Justice Scalia urges judges to become textualists.
Treating the Constitution as text limits some of the democratic
difficulties of having a Supreme Court which not only interprets law
but also makes it. As Justice Scalia notes: “In textual interpretation,
context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not
to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an
expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though, not an
interpretation that the language will not bear.”120 To do otherwise,
Justice Scalia argues, would be to engage in “a common-law way of
making law, and not the way of construing a democratically adopted
text.”121 And neither the Framers’ intent nor the text of the
Constitution itself can “possibly lead to the conclusion that its only
effect is to take the power of changing rights away from the
legislature and give it to the courts.”122

D. The Textualist Approach Exemplified
The minority opinions in Atkins evidence the textualist approach
to comparative constitutional interpretation. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued, the question before the Court in Atkins was

116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. See id. at 301 (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
118. SCALIA, supra note 72.
119. Id. at 38–39.
120. Id. at 37.
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 41.
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whether a national consensus deprives Virginia of the constitutional
power to impose the death penalty on capital murder defendants
like petitioner . . . who indisputably are competent to stand trial,
aware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why, and
whose mental retardation has been found an insufficiently
compelling reason to lessen their individual responsibility for
123
the crime.

While taking umbrage with what the Chief Justice termed a view to
state legislative history that was a “a post hoc rationalization for the
majority’s subjectively preferred result rather than any objective
effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency,”
the Chief Justice’s main aim in writing was to point out the “defects in
the Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of
professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls in reaching
its conclusion.”124
The Chief Justice approached the issue by first noting that it is
contemporary American values that are dispositive in determining
125
evolving standards of decency. Such American values ought to be,
therefore, determined by looking to the voice of the people: their
elected representatives in the legislatures. For, in a democracy,
legislatures, and “not courts, are constituted to respond to the will
126
and consequently the moral values of the people.” Urging restraint,
the Chief Justice noted that Supreme Court precedent has cautioned
against using “‘the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause’ to cut off the normal democratic processes.”127 For the Chief
Justice, this is not just a question about federalism and judicial
restraint, but also a question of objectivity.128 In short, while the
majority relied upon a certain common law conception of the law in

123. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002).
124. Id. at 2252–53.
125. Id. at 2253.
126. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1976)).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 2253–54:
In my view, these two sources—the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury
determinations—ought to be the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the
contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. They are the only objective indicia of contemporary values firmly
supported by our precedents. More importantly, however, they can be reconciled with
the undeniable precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual
sentencing juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving
effect to the complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of
publicly acceptable criminal punishments.
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reaching its conclusion, the Chief Justice’s dissent evidenced concerns
of federalism, democratic legitimacy, and objectivity.
Justice Scalia as well articulated concerns with the majority’s
approach. Justice Scalia began by noting that a punishment is cruel
and unusual if it falls within one of two limited categories: “those
modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted . . . and modes
of punishment that are inconsistent with modern ‘standards of
decency,’ as evinced by objective indicia, the most important of which
129
is ‘legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”
To Justice Scalia, the first prong of the analysis requires one to
130
look to the text as the Framers used it. Quickly, Justice Scalia
concluded that the execution of the mildly mentally retarded would
131
not have been considered cruel and unusual in 1791. The second
prong is to look to evolving standards of decency as made plain
through recourse to objective factors, as opposed to the “subjective
views of individual Justices.”132 The objective standards to be looked
to are the statutes passed by legislatures of the United States.133 For
Justice Scalia, it “will rarely if ever be the case that the Members of
this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the
American people than do their elected representatives.”134 As such,
what really underlies the majority’s opinion in this case in the words
of Justice Scalia is a “pretension to a power confined neither by the
129. Id. at 2260 (citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. As a side note, one might observe that Justice Scalia uses a version of comparative
constitutional analysis by referencing the writings of Blackstone to determine, as of the framing,
what the words “cruel and unusual” meant. Id. While some commentators might take this as
evidence that Justice Scalia is employing comparative constitutional analysis even though he
decries the same, a more limited point might be made. Justice Scalia is using, what might be
termed, foundational comparative analysis only to determine the actual context and meanings
of the text of the Constitution to render thereby a reasonable construction to the language.
Justice Scalia is not saying that the comparison is persuasive authority for determining the
contemporaneous federal constitutional question, which is how the majority in both Atkins and
Lawrence utilizes the comparative enterprise. Rather, it is an aid to the judge in determining the
text to be interpreted, thereby resolving the constitutional quandary. Assuming arguendo that
Justice Scalia is engaged in a more complete use of comparative analysis, this is a limited
analysis indeed. For, it would likely end at the framing. As such, comparative constitutional
analysis for Justice Scalia would have little or no relevance for determining evolving standards
of decency, or other standards, for contemporary America.
132. Id. at 2261. To be sure, some might think that Justice Scalia’s own interpretation of
non-comparative factors has at least the same potential for subjectivity.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
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moral sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its
original meaning) nor even by the current moral sentiments of the
135
American people.”
To be sure, this strong language well articulates the dissenters’
concern with the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. It also explains a pitfall with the Supreme Court’s use of
comparative constitutional analysis. By using comparative analysis,
the Court sets itself up to usurp the law from its organic ground: the
American people. In light of this critique, in the next Part this Note
urges restraint as to the uses of comparative constitutional analysis in
interpreting the Constitution.
III. THE PROBLEM OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As has been explained elsewhere, the comparative method itself
136
may be questionable. Not least of these many critiques is the
question of its relational viability, objectivity, and democratic
137
legitimacy. As Professor Dieter Grimm contends, a constitution
“goes back to an act taken by or at least attributed to the people, in
138
which they attribute political capacity to themselves.” Such an
action places the people in a reflexive relationship to their
government, which is in accord with American notions of liberalism
and constitutional democracy. Using comparative constitutional
analysis—a device that is outside the demos—as an aid in
interpretation poses serious practical and theoretical problems for
constitutional democracy. For instance, modern liberal democracies,
like the American democracy, tend to justify judicial authority “in
terms of the rule of law.”139 Rule-of-law arguments in a liberal
democracy tend to produce an argument for “legislative sovereignty
140
in its narrowest and least reflective sense.” Yet, the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Atkins and Lawrence show that state legislative
sovereignty may be overcome, in part, through appealing to
comparative constitutionalism. While such an approach might be
135.
136.

Id. at 2265.
See Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 101, 101–15 (1989) (illustrating that the method of comparative law may in its
applied version be faced with very serious problems).
137. Id.
138. Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282, 290 (1995).
139. Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 339,
341 (2002).
140. Id.
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acceptable to a common lawyer, there is one important difference
when interpreting the Constitution. Under the common law
approach, legislatures had the power to overturn common law
doctrines. Yet, when interpreting the Constitution in this fashion
serious questions confront democratic legitimacy, for democracy
cannot prevail absent the improbability of constitutional amendment.
141
The law is imbedded in the culture and history of the people.
Montesquieu reasoned that the law is related to the nature of the
people and derived from the spirit of the people, which is their
culture.142 And in America, Tocqueville articulated that the law is
both an expression of culture and the hope for forming a culture
143
based on first principles. In effect, culture affects the law and law
affects culture. Through the law, societies formulate certain interests
at the cultural level, which are translated into demands that are
responded to within the legal system.144 Thus, the law can be seen as
an expression of the cultural desires of the people, and culture is seen
as the hand which drives the law. Through the law, communities
engage in the process of understanding themselves through symbolic
expression.145 As such, it is hard to disaggregate legislation from its
cultural instantiation. Professor Pierre Legrand observes:
As an accretion of cultural elements, it [a rule of law or piece of
legislation] is buttressed by important historical and ideological
formations. A rule does not have any empirical existence that can be
significantly detached from the world of meanings that defines a
141. The Supreme Court’s most clear acknowledgement of this notion is in the area of
substantive due process. When determining whether a right is fundamental, the Court relies on
American history and tradition. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)
(“[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
142. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
bk. 1, ch. 3, at 104–05 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) (“[The
laws] should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are made, as to render it
very unlikely for those of one nation to be proper for another.”).
143. Cf. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1946) (1835):
Social condition is commonly the result of circumstances, sometimes of laws,
oftener still of these two causes united; but when once established, it may justly be
considered as itself the source of almost all the laws, the usages, and the ideas which
regulate the conduct of nations: whatever it does not produce, it modifies.
144. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37
STAN. J. INT’L L. 347 (2001).
145. Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55, 68
(David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
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legal culture; the part is an expression and a synthesis of the whole:
146
it resonates.

Yet, when the Court employs comparative constitutional analysis, not
only is the judicial capacity to use such analysis called into question,
so is the prudence of such action.
The role of the courts in a democratic system is to use judicial
authority cautiously so as not to upset the important acculturation of
society through the legislative process. Yet, as Professors Carrington
and Powell note, the Court may have “lost touch with its
responsibility for the nurture and protection of representative
government and has acquired the habit of deciding just about any
interesting question that comes its way with little or no regard for the
147
preferences of those who were elected to decide them.” There are
problems with this approach to judicial review. According to
Professors F. L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, liberal democracies work
“only when majorities rather than minorities rule, and when it is
obvious to all that ruling majorities are themselves coalitions of
minorities in a pluralistic society.”148 Going further, they add that
“[r]epresentative institutions facilitate this fundamental democratic
149
disposition” while “judicial power undermines it.” In short, however
“correctly” they may rule, judges “can serve a Republic, but can
never rule one.”150 The courts were not protected in American
constitutional government “in order that they might, in their wisdom,
govern us; they were protected so that there would be no interference
with the law’s governing us.”151 The Court, therefore, would be well
advised to use caution when confronted with the option of employing
comparative constitutional analysis, lest it run the risk of joining the
judicial and legislative functions.152
The American culture is one where the legislature passes the law
and the judiciary expounds upon it. To be sure, this either/or
dichotomy is too simplified to recognize the inevitable lawmaking
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 59.
Carrington & Powell, supra note 73, at 3.
F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT
PARTY 149 (2000).
149. Id.
150. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY 224 (1999).
151. CAHILL, supra note 76, at 8.
152. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 116, at 303 (James Madison) (“The judges can
exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any
legislative function, though they may be advised by the legislative councils.”).
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that does occur judicially. Yet, it should perhaps breed caution in
judicial approach. As Elihu Root noted:
It is not the duty of our courts to be leaders in reform, . . . or, except
in very narrow limits, to readjust our laws to new social conditions.
The judge is always confined within the narrow limits of reasonable
interpretation. It is not his function or within his power to enlarge or
improve or change the law. . . . By virtue of the special duty imposed
upon them, our courts are excluded from playing the part of
reformers. Their duty is to interpret the law as it is, in sincerity and
153
truth, under the sanction of their oaths and in the spirit of justice.

Comparative constitutional analysis as an aid for explication is
perhaps too far removed from the people—the ultimate authority of
the law that is to be expounded upon—to be congruous with
154
Thus, the Court should exercise
American constitutionalism.
restraint. For in the words of Justice Stone, “while unconstitutional
exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the
government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our
155
own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.”
To employ comparative analysis might run the risk of
overturning the American legal culture and American
constitutionalism. Each legal system is autonomous and is perhaps
incapable of transplant. Any transplant would be a rejection of the
organic law that is part of that society and culture. The use of

153. Elihu Root, The Importance of an Independent Judiciary, 72 THE INDEP. 704,
704 (1912).
154. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–
77 (1989):
In a democratic system, of course, the general rule of law has special claim to
preference, since it is the normal product of that branch of government most
responsive to the people. Executives and judges handle individual cases; the
legislature generalizes. Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate
clarity or precision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic—and, in the
extreme, unconstitutional—because they leave too much to be decided by persons
other than the people’s representatives.
. . . In a judicial system such as ours, in which judges are bound, not only by the
text of code or Constitution, but also by the prior decisions of superior courts, and
even by the prior decisions of their own court, courts have the capacity to “make”
law. Let us not quibble about the theoretical scope of a “holding”; the modern reality,
at least, is that when the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of one of the state
systems, decides a case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the mode of
analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the lower courts within that
system, and even by that supreme court itself. And by making the mode of analysis
relatively principled or relatively fact-specific, the courts can either establish general
rules or leave ample discretion for the future.
155.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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comparative law—besides the general observation that it would not
be consonant with American culture, society, and mores—imposes a
normative construct of others on American law and thus on the
American people. As President Abraham Lincoln cautioned:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, . . . the people
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that
156
eminent tribunal.

CONCLUSION
This Note seeks to show that the use of comparative analysis, at
least for the current Supreme Court, is not just about whether
comparative law should have persuasive authority. Instead, the
current debate raging on the Court and exemplified in Atkins v.
Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas is about the proper role of the
judiciary in a separation of powers system. This is a debate that
should be ongoing. The debate should not be obfuscated by recourse
to the notion that the majorities in Atkins and Lawrence are being
proactive and the minority is showing a brand of American
exceptionalism. The appropriateness of comparative constitutional
analysis has only a tangential connection to whether America is a
hegemonic or exceptionalist power. Instead, comparative
constitutional analysis does have something to do with the nature of
the law. And the nature of law in the American democracy should
perhaps breed caution on the part of the judiciary. If the American
judiciary is to live up to the promise of the founding to create a
government “of the people, by the people, and for the people,”157 then
restraint will have to be exercised in this important area of
judicial decisionmaking.

156. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 133, 139 (Bicentennial ed. 1989).
157. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in FAMOUS
SPEECHES BY EMINENT AMERICAN STATESMEN 103, 103 (Frederick C. Hicks ed., 1929).

